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Forthcoming

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  • ‘Quasi-Fideism and Virtuous Anti-Evidentialism: Wittgenstein and Newman on Knowledge and Certainty’, Newman and Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) J. Milburn & F. Aquino, (London: Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)

 

  • 'Hume and Wittgenstein on Naturalism and Scepticism’, Hume and Contemporary Epistemology, (eds.) S. Stapleford & V. Wagner, (London: Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)

 

  • 'Putnam and Wittgenstein on Radical Scepticism’, Interpreting Putnam, (eds.) R. Gronda & G. Marchetti, (London: Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)

 

  • 'The Nature and Value of Understanding’, Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, (eds.) M. Dumitru & A. I. Marasoiu, (London: Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)

 

  • 'Educating for Virtuous Intellectual Character’ (with G. A. Orona), Advancing Measurement of a 21st Century Liberal Arts Education, (eds.) R. Arum, P. Courant & A. Flaster, (Publisher TBC, forthcoming). 

 

  • 'Virtuous Intellectual Character as the Epistemic Goal of Education’, Educating for Moral and Intellectual Maturation: Toward Greater Social Justice Through Initiatives of Excellence in Undergraduate Education, (ed.) J. M. Whiteley, (Publisher TBC, forthcoming). 

 

  • 'Virtuous Arguing’, The Epistemology of Conversation, (ed.) W. Silva Filho, (Dordrecht, Holland: Springer, forthcoming). (pdf)

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  • ‘Pyrrhonism and Wittgensteinian Quietism’, Ancient Scepticism and Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) L. Perissinotto & B. R. Cámara, (Mimesis International, forthcoming). (pdf)​​

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  • ‘Extended Social Epistemology’, Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, (eds.) J. Lackey & A. McGlynn, (Oxford UP, forthcoming). (pdf)

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  • ‘Shadowlands’, The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, (ed.) J. Dutant, (Oxford UP, forthcoming). (pdf)​​​

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  • ‘Deep Disagreement’, Routledge Handbook to Philosophy of Disagreement, (eds.) M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter & R. Rowland (Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)​

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  • 'The Epistemic Value of Cognitive Contact with Reality’, The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception, (eds.) B. Brogaard & R. French, (Dordrecht, Holland: Springer). (NON-FINAL pdf)

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  • ‘The Epistemic Goals of Education’, prepared as part of the educational resource, Philosophy of Education for Teachers, (ed.) J. De Souza, for the organization Parents and Teachers for Excellence. (pdf)

2024

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  • ‘Hypocritical Experts’, Overcoming the Myth of Neutrality: Expertise for a New World, (eds.) M. Farina & A. Lavazza, 73-90, (London: Routledge, 2024). (pdf)

 

  • ‘Epistemic Vertigo and Existential Angst’, Conversations: Journal of Cavellian Studies [invited for special issue, (eds.) G. Bearn, F. Casati & F. Gandellini], 11 (2024), 17-36. (pdf)

 

  • 'There Cannot be Lucky Knowledge’ & ‘Reply to Hetherington’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (3rd Edn.), (eds.) B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri & E. Sosa, 159-68 & 171-73, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2024). [Translated into Arabic by M. Salim for Thaqafa Magazine]. (pdf, pdf)

 

  • 'Religious Vertigo’, Religionsphilosophie nach Wittgenstein (Philosophy of Religion after Wittgenstein), (ed.) E. Ramharter, ch. 11, (Stuttgart, Germany: Metzler/Springer, 2024). (pdf)​​

 

  • 'Epistemological Disjunctivism and Evidence’, Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, (eds.) M. Lasonen-Aarnio & C. Littlejohn, ch. 3, (London: Routledge, 2024). (pdf)

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  • 'Public Expertise and Ignorance’, Expertise: Philosophical Perspectives, (eds.) M. Farina, A. Lavazza & D. H. Pritchard, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024). (pdf)

2023

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  • ‘Hinge Commitments and Trust’, Synthese [special issue on ‘Scepticism, Value and Action’, (eds.) P. Klein & J. Wang], (2023), [DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04378-x]. (pdf)

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  • 'Understanding Deep Disagreement’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2023) 31, 303-17. [Translated into Spanish, ‘Comprender los Desacuerdos Profundos’, by U. Dávalos for Desacuerdos Profundos: Debates y Aproximaciones (Deep Disagreement: Debates and Approaches), (ed.) G. Arroyo, (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones UNGS)]. (pdf)

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  • 'Moderate Knowledge Externalism’, Externalism About Knowledge, (ed.) L R. G. Oliveira, 131-49, (Oxford UP, 2023). (pdf)​​​

 

  • 'Truth as a Fundamental Value’, Practices of Truth in Philosophy: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, (eds.) P. Gori & L. Serini, 8-23, (London: Routledge, 2023). (pdf)

 

  • 'Epistemic Virtue in Higher Education: Testing the Mechanisms of Intellectual Character Development’ (with G. A. Orona, R. Arum, J. Eccles, Q.-V. Dang, D. Copp, D. Herrmann, B. Rushing & S. Zitzmann), Current Psychology (2023), [DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-05005-1]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Educating for Virtuous Intellectual Character and Valuing Truth’, Philosophies (invited for special issue on ‘Between Virtue and Epistemology’, (ed.) G. Schonbaumsfeld), 8, 29 (2023), [DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020029]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Skepticism, Fideism, and Religious Epistemology’, Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology, (eds.) J. Fuqua, J. Greco & T. McNabb, 384-53, (Cambridge UP, 2023). (pdf)​

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  • 'Knowledge From Error and Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology’, Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge, (eds.) R. Borges & I. Schnee, ch. 6, (London: Routledge, 2023). (pdf)

 

  • 'Extended Knowledge and Autonomous Belief’, Inquiry (2023), [DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2238291]. (pdf)

 

  • ‘Critical Notice of Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains, by Ernest Sosa (OUP, 2021)’, Philosophical Review (2023). (pdf)​​​

2022

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  • ‘Exploring Quasi-Fideism’, Hinge Epistemology, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & C. Sandis, ch. 2, (London: Anthem, 2022). (pdf)

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  • ‘In Defence of the Modal Account of Legal Risk’, Synthese (2022), [DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03693-z]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’, Frontiers in Psychology (2022), [DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.894738]. (pdf)

 

  • 'Scepticism and Commonsense’, Analysis 82 (2022), 716-25. (pdf)

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  • ​'Factive Reasons and Propositional Justification’, Propositional and Doxastic Justification, (eds) L. Oliveira & P. Silva, 79-98, (Routledge, 2022). (pdf)

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  • ‘Hinge Commitments and Common Knowledge’, Synthese 200 (2022), [DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03647-5]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Intellectual Virtue and Its Role in Epistemology’, Asian Journal of Philosophy [invited keynote essay as part of a special issue devoted to my work], 1 (2022), [DOI: 10.1007/s44204-022-00024-4]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Virtuous Arguing With Conviction and Humility’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2022), [DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10328-2]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Quasi-Fideism and Epistemic Relativism’, Inquiry (2022), [DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2135820]. (pdf)​​

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  • ‘Putnam on Radical Skepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion-Sensitive Semantics’, Engaging Putnam, (eds.) J. Conant & S. Chakraborty, 263-88, (DeGruyter, 2022). (pdf)​​​​​

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  • ‘Extended Ignorance’, Embodied, Extended, Ignorant Minds: New Studies on the Nature of Not-Knowing, (eds.) S. Arfini & L. Magnani, ch. 4, (Springer, 2022). (pdf)

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  • ‘Education as the Social Cultivation of Intellectual Virtue’ (with M. Croce), Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, 583-601, (Routledge, 2022). (pdf)​

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  • ‘On Solidarity: Collectivity, Trust, and Deference’ (response to Heather Battaly’s ‘Solidarity: Virtue or Vice?’), Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, 329-31, (Routledge, 2022). (pdf)​

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  • ‘Virtue Responsibilism, Mindware, and Education’ (with M. Croce; response to Steven Bland’s ‘Interactionism, Debiasing, and the Division of Epistemic Labour’), Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, 42-44, (Routledge, 2022). (pdf) 

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  • ​‘Response to Commentaries by Alessandra Tanesini and Lani Watson’ (with M. Croce), Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, 609-12, (Routledge, 2022).​ (pdf)​​

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  • ‘Cultivating Intellectual Virtues’, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Education, (ed.) R. Curren, ch. 11, (Routledge, 2022). (pdf)

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  • ​‘In Defence of Closure’, New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, (eds.) M. Jope & D. H. Pritchard, ch. 7, (Routledge, 2022). ​(pdf)

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  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (2022 update, with J. A. Carter & J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta.

2021

  • ‘Ignorance and Inquiry’, American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2021), 111-23. [Translated into Tunisian by Oussama Slim for MAANA]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Extended Cognition, Assistive Technology and Education’, (with A. English & J. Ravenscroft), Synthese (2021), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03166-9. (pdf)

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  • ‘Inculcating Curiosity: Pilot Results of an Online Module to Enhance Undergraduate Intellectual Virtue’ (with G. A. Orona), Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education 47 (2021), 375-89 [DOI: 10.1080/02602938.2021.1919988]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo’, Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2021), 1-22. (pdf)

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  • ‘Philosophy in Prison and the Cultivation of Intellectual Character’, Journal of Prison Education and Reentry 7 (2021), 130-43. (pdf)

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  • 'Ignorance and Normativity’, Philosophical Topics 49 (2021), 225-43. (pdf)

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  • ​​‘Against the Odds: the Case for a Modal Understanding of Due Care’ (with J. Helmreich), Truth and Trials: Dilemmas at the Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Law, (eds.) Z. Hoskins & J. Robson, ch. 9, (Routledge, 2021). (pdf)

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  • ‘Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Commonsense and Philosophy’, Cambridge Companion to Common Sense Philosophy, (eds.) R. Peels & R. van Woudenberg, (Cambridge UP, 2021). (pdf)

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  • ‘Veritism and the Goal of Inquiry’, Philosophia 49 (2021), 1347-59. (pdf)

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  • ‘Sceptical Fideism and Quasi-Fideism’, Manuscrito [special issue on ‘Contemporary Philosophy of Religion’, (eds.) F. M. Bertato & N. C. Salvatore], 44 (2021), 1-21. (pdf)

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  • ‘Omniscience and Ignorance’, Veritas [special issue on ‘Epistemology and Philosophy of Language’, (ed.) O. Bueno], 66 (2021). (pdf)

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  • ‘Varieties of Epistemic Risk’, Acta Analytica [special journal issue on ‘Epistemic Luck’, (ed.) M. J. Shaffer], (2021), DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00489-7. (pdf)

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  • ‘Veritic Desire’, Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies [special issue on ‘The Social Dimension of the Ethics of Knowledge: Intellectual Virtues and Intellectual Vices in Epistemic Practices’, (ed.) L. Candiotto], 14 (2021), 1-21. (pdf)

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  • ‘Skeptical Invariantism and the Source of Skepticism’, Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, (eds.) C. Kyriacou & K. Wallbridge, (Routledge, 2021). (pdf)​​

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  • ‘Assurance and Disjunctivism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2021), 715-20. [Symposium on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity, (Oxford UP, 2018)]. (pdf)​​

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  • ‘Good News, Bad News, Fake News’, Epistemology of Fake News, (eds.) S. Bernecker, A. Flowerre & T. Grundman, 44-67, (Oxford UP, 2021). (pdf)

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  • ‘In Defence of Veritism’ & ‘In Defence of Veritism: Responses to My Critics’, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science [invited lead article for symposium with commentators: Sergei Levin, John Greco, Shane Ryan & Ernest Sosa], 58 (2021), 22-37 & 68-77. (pdf, pdf)

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  • ​‘On Hinge Epistemology’, Skepsis (2021). Iinvited submission; and to be translated into Portuguese in Hinge Epistemology, (eds.) M. N. Figueiredo & P. Smith, (Associação Filosófica Scientiae Studia)]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Socrates as Intellectual Character Builder’ (with A. Kotsonis, I. Lytra & T. Scaltsas), Dialogoi: Ancient Philosophy Today (forthcoming). [Invited contribution]. (pdf)

2020

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  • ‘Educating For Intellectual Humility and Conviction’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2020), 398-409. [To be reprinted in Teaching and Learning: Epistemic, Metaphysical and Ethical Dimensions, (ed.) D. Bakhurst, (Blackwell, forthcoming)]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology’, Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, (eds.) J. Greco & C. Kelp, 203-24, (Cambridge UP, 2020). (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemic Vertigo’, The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds, (eds.) B. Brogaard & D. Gatzia, ch. 7, (Routledge, 2020). (pdf)

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  • ‘Extended Cognition and Humility’, Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, (eds.) M. Alfano, M. Lynch & A. Tanesini, ch. 39, (Routledge, 2020). (pdf)

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  • ‘Knowledge, Skill, and Virtue Epistemology’, Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, (eds.) C. Pavese & E. Fridland, 135-45, (Routledge, 2020). (pdf)

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  • ‘Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, (eds.) D. Brown & F. Macpherson, 42-51, (Routledge, 2020). (pdf)

2019

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  • ‘The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement’ (with J. A. Carter), Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 44 (2019), 220-42. (pdf)

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  • ‘Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux’, Synthese [Online First (2019), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02504-2]. [As part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, (Princeton UP, 2015)]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism’, Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus, (eds.) J. Vlasits & K. M. Vogt, 172-92, (Oxford UP, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Philosophy in Prisons: Intellectual Virtue and the Community of Philosophical Inquiry’, Teaching Philosophy (2019), DOI: 10.5840/teachphil201985108. (pdf) 

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  • ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as Pyrrhonism in Action’, Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at Things From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, (eds.) N. de Costa & S. Wuppuluri, 91-106, (Springer, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemic Relativism and Epistemic Internalism’, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, (ed.) M. Kusch, 292-300, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Disagreement, Intellectual Humility, and Reflection’, Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology, (ed.) W. Da Silva Filho, ch. 5, (Springer, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Factive Bases for Belief’, Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, (eds.) P. Bondy & J. A. Carter, 235-50, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

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  • 'Précis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Skepsis (as part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing), 10 (2019), 47-54 & 83-93. (pdf, pdf) 

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  • ‘Scepticism and Atheism’, A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, (ed.) G. Oppy, 277-90, (Blackwell, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Modal Accounts of Luck’, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, (eds.) I. Church & R. Hartman, ch. 10, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Extended Self-Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative, (eds.) J. E. Kirsch & P. Pedrini, 31-49, (Springer, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Extended Entitlement’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Entitlement, (eds.) P. Graham & N. Pedersen, 223-39, (Oxford UP, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Contemporary Responses to Radical Scepticism’, Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945 to 2015, (eds.) K. Becker & I. Thomson, ch. 8, (Cambridge UP, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) H. Battaly, ch. 23, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History—Vol IV: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) S. Hetherington & M. Valaris, ch. 11, (Bloomsbury, 2019). (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, (eds.) C. Doyle, J. Milburn & D. H. Pritchard, 41-58, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

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2018

  • ‘Epistemic Angst’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2018), 70-90. [Translated into Spanish as ‘La Angustia Epistémica’ by T. Verthen for Problemas Escépticos (‘Skeptical Problems’), (ed.) J. Ornelas]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Unnatural Doubts’, Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, (eds.) G. A. Bruno & A. Rutherford, 223-47, (Routledge 2018). (pdf)

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  • ‘Extended Virtue Epistemology’, Inquiry 61 (2018), 632-47. (pdf)

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  • ‘Legal Risk, Legal Evidence, and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice’, Jurisprudence 9 (2018), 108-19. [Reprinted in The Faces of Virtue in Law, (eds.) A. Amaya & C. Michelon, ch. 9, (Routledge, 2019)]. (pdf)

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  • ‘Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education’, Metaphilosophy 49 (2018), 328-49. [Reprinted in Connecting Virtues: Advances in Ethics, Epistemology, and Political Philosophy, (eds.) M. Croce & M. S. Vaccarezza, 129-50, (Blackwell, 2018). (pdf)

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  • ‘Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2018), 51-66. (pdf)

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  • ‘Disagreement, of Belief and Otherwise’, Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, (ed.) C. Johnson, 22-39, (Routledge, 2018). (pdf)

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  • ‘Extended Knowledge’, Extended Epistemology, (eds.) J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos & D. H. Pritchard, 90-104, (Oxford UP, 2018). (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Biscopic Treatment of Radical Scepticism’, The Factive Turn in Epistemology, (ed.) V. Mitova, 15-31, (Cambridge UP, 2018). [Translated into Portugese by E. Carvalho, and published in Sképsis]. (pdf)

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  • ‘The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck’, The Gettier Problem, (ed.) S. Hetherington, 96-107, (Cambridge UP, 2018). (pdf)

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  • ‘Precis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Manuscrito 41 (2018), 115-65. [As part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing (Princeton UP, 2015)]. (pdf), (pdf) 

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  • ‘Aesthetic Risk’, Think 17 (2018), 1-14. (pdf)

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  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter & J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2018). 

2017

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  • ‘Faith and Reason’, Philosophy (invited special issue on Religious Epistemology), 81 (2017), 101-18. (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemically Useful False Beliefs’, Philosophical Explorations 20 (2017), 4-20. (pdf)

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  • ‘Scepticism and Disjunctivism’ (with C. Ranalli), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, (eds.) D. Machuca & B. Reed, 652-67, (Bloomsbury, 2017). (pdf)

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  • ‘Inference to the Best Explanation and Epistemic Circularity’ (with J. A. Carter), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, (eds.) K. McCain & T. Poston, 133-48, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge-First Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge-First Epistemology, (eds.) J. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis, 200-22, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)

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  • ‘Wittgenstein on Hinge Commitments and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty’, Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, (eds.) H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman, 563-75, (Blackwell, 2017). (pdf)

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  • ‘Knowledge, Luck and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem’, Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on The Gettier Problem, (eds.) C. Almeida, P. Klein & R. Borges, 57-73, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemic Situationism, Epistemic Dependence, and the Epistemology of Education’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Situationism, (eds.) M. Alfano & A. Fairweather, 168-91, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)

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  • ‘Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding’ (with J. A. Carter), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, (eds.) S. Ammon, C. Baumberger, C. Beisbart, G. Brun & S. Grimm, 272-92, (Routledge, 2017). (pdf)

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  • ‘Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value’, Synthese 194 (2017), 1477–86. (pdf)

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  • ‘Intellectual Pride and Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pride, (eds.) J. A. Carter & E. Gordon, 69-78, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). (pdf)

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  • ‘Is There a Fundamental Tension Between Faith and Rationality?’, Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, 53-61, (Routledge, 2017).

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  • ‘How Do Scientific Claims Relate to the Truth?’ (with S. O Palermos), Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, 4-15, (Routledge, 2017).

2016

  • ‘Epistemic Risk’, Journal of Philosophy 113 (2016), 550-71. (pdf)

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  • ‘Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophical Studies 173 (2016), 969-90. (pdf)

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  • ‘Seeing It For Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy’, Episteme 13 (2016), 29-42. (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemic Dependence’, Philosophical Perspectives 30 (2016), 1-20. (pdf)

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  • ‘Contextualism and Radical Scepticism’, Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1122-0. (pdf)

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  • ‘Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification’ (with P. Bondy), Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1262-2. (pdf)

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  • ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat’, Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1074-4. (pdf)

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  • ‘Epistemic Axiology’, Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals, (eds.) M. Grajner & P. Schmechtig, 407-22, (DeGruyter, 2016). (pdf)

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  • ‘Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism’ and ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism: Responses to My Critics’, Journal of Philosophical Research (2016) 41, 175-81 & 221-38. [As part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 2012)]. (pdf), (pdf)

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  • ‘The Distribution of Epistemic Agency’ (with O. Palermos), Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-Centralizing Epistemic Agency, (ed.) P. Reider, 109-26, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). (pdf)

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  • ‘From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Res Philosophica 93 (2016), 533-52. (pdf)

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  • ‘Ignorance and Epistemic Value’, The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, (eds.) M. Blaauw & R. Peels, 132-43, (Cambridge UP, 2016). (pdf)

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  • ‘Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays In Applied Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) J. Baehr, 113-27, (Routledge, 2016). (pdf)

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  • ‘Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications, (ed.) M. Fernandez, 31-50, (Oxford UP, 2016). (pdf)

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  • ‘On Metaepistemological Scepticism’ (with C. Ranalli), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, (eds.) M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger, 205-23, (Oxford UP, 2016). (pdf)

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  • ‘Radical Scepticism and Brains in Vats’ (with C. Ranalli), The Brain in a Vat, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 75-89, (Cambridge UP, 2016). (pdf)

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  • ‘Intellectual Humility, Knowledge-How, and Disagreement’ (with J. A. Carter), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue, (eds.) M. Slote, E. Sosa & C. Mi, 49-63, (Routledge, 2016). (pdf)

​

  • ‘The Sources of Scepticism’, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (invited special issue on Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein), 6 (2016), 203-27. [Translated into Spanish by V. Raga-Rosaleny for Estudios de Filosofía 60 (2019), 239-66]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Veritism and Epistemic Value’, Alvin Goldman and His Critics, (eds.) H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin, 200-18, (Blackwell, 2016). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue’, Zi Ran Bian Zheng Fa Tong Xun [Journal of Dialectics of Nature], (2016). [Invited].

2015

  • ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015), 93-111. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Risk’, Metaphilosophy 46 (2015), 436-61. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck’ (with J. A. Carter), Noûs 49 (2015), 440-53. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015), 181-99. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value’ (with J. A. Carter), Australasian Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2015), 799-816. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism’ and ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism: Responses to My Critics’, Analysis 75 (2015), 589-95 & 627-37.[As part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 2012)]. (pdf), (pdf)

​

  • ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman’, God, Truth and Other Enigmas, (ed.) M. Szatkowski, 141-64, (de Gruyter, 2015). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Die Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie’, Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu?, (eds.) D. Koppelberg & S. Tolksdorf, 153-78, (Mentis, 2015).

2014

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth’ (with J. Kallestrup), European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014), 335-57. (pdf)

​

  • ‘The Modal Account of Luck’, Metaphilosophy 45 (2014), 594-619. [Reprinted in The Philosophy of Luck, (eds.) D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington, 143-68, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015)]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Varieties of Externalism’ (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), Philosophical Issues 24 (2014), 63-109. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, Virtue Scientia: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, (ed.) A. Fairweather, 315-28, (Springer, 2014). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion’, Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, (eds.) C. Littlejohn & J. Turri, 155-72, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Sceptical Intuitions’, Intuitions, (eds.) D. Rowbottom & T. Booth, 213-31, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing’, Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, (eds.) D. Dodd & E. Zardini, 190-213, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good’, The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, (eds.) J. Matheson & R. Vitz, 112-29, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Re-evaluating the Epistemic Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology’, Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, (eds.) A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan, 143-54, (Cambridge UP, 2014). (pdf)

​

  • ‘What is this Thing Called Science? A Very Brief Philosophical Overview’, (with M. Massimi), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone, (ed.) M. Massimi, 1-13, (Routledge, 2014).  

​

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture 478 (2014), 47-66. [Invited]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Zagzebski on Rationality’ (with S. Ryan), European Journal of Philosophy of Religion 6 (2014), 39-46. (pdf)

2013

  • ‘The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, (eds.) J. Greco & R. Groff, ch. 13, (Routledge, 2013). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, (eds.) T. Henning & D. Schweikard, 209-226, (Routledge, 2013). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2013), 236-47. [Reprinted in Education and the Growth of Knowledge: Perspectives From Social and Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) B. Kotzee, 92-105, (Blackwell, 2013)]. (pdf)

​

​

  • ‘Davidson on Radical Skepticism’, Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, (eds.) E. LePore & K. Ludwig, 521-33, (Blackwell, 2013). (pdf) 

​

  • ‘There Cannot be Lucky Knowledge’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd Ed.), (eds.) M. Steup, J. Turri & E. Sosa, 152-64, (Blackwell, 2013). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Rorty, Williams and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Humanities (invited submission for special issue on Richard Rorty), 2 (2013), 351-68. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemic Value’, Philosophical Inquiries 1 (2013), 1-37. [Invited]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo’ (with C. Boult), Philosophia 41 (2013), 27-35. (pdf)

2012

  • ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012), 247-79. [Reprinted in Epistemology: Major Works, (ed.) R. Neta, (Routledge, 2013); translated by G. Gaboardy into Portugese for Intuitio 9 (2016), 148-181; translated by J. Wang, Y. Yinzhu & L. Linhui into Chinese for Contemporary Western Philosophy 14 (2018), 137-64]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2012), 84-103. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing’, Synthese 189 (2012), 255-72. [Translated into Portugese by J. do Carmo]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘In Defence of Modest Anti-Luck Epistemology’, The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, (eds.) T. Black & K. Becker, 173-92, (Cambridge UP, 2012). (pdf)

​

  • ‘On Meta-Epistemology’, Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (2012), 91-108. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Disagreement, Scepticism, and Track-Record Arguments’, Disagreement and Skepticism, (ed.) D. Machuca, 150-68, (Routledge, 2012). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Hume on Miracles’ (with A. Richmond), The Continuum Companion to Hume, (eds.) A. Bailey & D. O’Brien, 227-45, (Continuum, 2012). (pdf)

 

  • ‘Two Conceptions of Radical Scepticism’, Ámbitos 28 (2012), 13-20. [Invited submission for special issue on Radical Scepticism].

2011

  • ‘Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism’, Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, (ed.) D. Machuca, 193-202, (Springer 2011). (pdf) 

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  • ‘Wittgenstein on Scepticism’, The Oxford Handbook on Wittgenstein, (eds.) O. Kuusela & M. McGinn, 521-47, (Oxford UP, 2011). (pdf)

​

  • ‘What is the Swamping Problem?’, Reasons for Belief, (eds.) A. Reisner & A. Steglich-Petersen, 244-59, (Cambridge UP, 2011). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem’, Philosophical Issues 21 (2011), 434-55. (pdf)

​

  • ‘The Genealogy of the Concept of Knowledge and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Der Begriff des Wissens/Conceptions of Knowledge, (ed.) S. Tolksdorf, 159-78, (de Gruyter, 2011). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 4 (2011), 145-59. (pdf)

​

  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2011). [Updated version available here].

​

  • ‘Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism’, Evidentialism and its Discontents, (ed.) T. Dougherty, 362-92, (Oxford UP, 2011). (pdf)

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  • ‘Skepticism and Information’ (with E. T. Kerr), Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy of Technology, (ed.) H. Demir, (Springer, 2011).

2010

  • ‘Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge, and Discrimination’, Noûs 44 (2010), 245-68. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis’, Synthese 175 (2010), 133-51. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Absurdity, Angst and The Meaning of Life’, Monist (2010) 93, 3-16. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology’, The Blackwell Companion to Relativism, (ed.) S. Hales, 266-85, (Blackwell, 2010). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Achievements, Luck and Value’, Think 25 (2010), 1-12. (pdf)

2009

  • ‘Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism’, Synthese 171 (2009), 467-79. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.) A. O’Hear, 19-43, (Cambridge UP, 2009). (pdf)

​

  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Harvard Review of Philosophy (2009) 16, 2-19. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning’ (with C. Kelp), All Truths Are Known: New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, (ed.) J. Salerno, 324-38, (Oxford UP, 2009). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Defusing Epistemic Relativism’, Synthese 166 (2009), 397-412. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Apt Performance and Epistemic Value’, Philosophical Studies (2009) 143, 407-16. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?’, Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (2009), 33-45. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge’, Analysis 69 (2009), 317-25. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2009) 17, 589-96. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge’, Central Issues of Philosophy, (ed.) J. Shand, 24-36, (Blackwell, 2009). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Radical Scepticism and Epistemic Value’, Iris 1 (2009), 419-28. [Invited for special issue on Contemporary Anti-Scepticism].

2008

  • ‘Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements’, Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 437-47. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value’, Proceedings and Addresses of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.) 82 (2008), 19-41. (pdf)

​

  • ‘McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism’, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, 283-310, (Oxford UP, 2008). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology’, The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, (ed.) J. Greco, 437-55, (Oxford UP, 2008). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (2008), 325-39. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism’, Social Epistemology 22 (2008), 305-23. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Certainty and Scepticism’, Philosophical Issues 18 (2008), 58-67. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited’, Metaphilosophy 39 (2008), 66-88. (pdf)

​

  • ‘A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophica 78 (2008), 13-28. (pdf)

2007

  • ‘McDowell and the New Evil Genius’ (with R. Neta), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), 381-96. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Synthese 158 (2007), 277-97. [As part of a special issue devoted to my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, 2005)]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘How to be a Neo-Moorean’, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 68-99, (Oxford UP, 2007). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Recent Work on Epistemic Value’, American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007), 85-110. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries’, New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.) V. F. Hendricks & D. H. Pritchard, 28-51, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). (pdf)

​

  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2007). [Updated version, now co-authored, available here]. 

2006

  • ‘Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck’, Philosophical Studies 116 (2006), 135-45. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Moral and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 37 (2006), 1-25. (pdf)

2005

  • ‘Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005), 185-206. (pdf)

​

  • ‘The Structure of Sceptical Arguments’, Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 37-52. (pdf)

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  • ‘Contextualism, Scepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manœuvres’, Knowledge and Skepticism, (eds.) J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein, 85-104, (MIT Press, 2005). (pdf)

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  • ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism’, Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein’s Last Work, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, 189-224, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). (pdf)

​

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge’, Philosophical Explorations 8 (2005), 229-43. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Neo-Mooreanism versus Contextualism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (2005), 20-43. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Greco on Scepticism’ (with C. van Putten), Erkenntnis 62 (2005), 277-84. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism’, Acta Analytica 20 (2005), 3-25. (pdf)

2004

  • ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), 326-48. [To be translated into Portuguese]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Epistemic Luck’, Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004), 193-222. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Epistemic Deflationism’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004), 103-34. (pdf)     

  

  • ‘The Psychology and Philosophy of Luck’ (with M. Smith), New Ideas in Psychology 22 (2004), 1-28. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Testimony’, The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due Process, (eds.) R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros, 101-20, (Hart, 2004). (pdf)

​

  • ‘An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism’ (with J. Kallestrup), Philosophia 31 (2004), 345-54. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Some Recent Work in Epistemology’, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 604-13. (pdf)

2003

  • ‘McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism’, European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003), 273-94. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Reforming Reformed Epistemology’, International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003), 43-66. [Reprinted in Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge, (eds.) R. Rood, S. Roeser & R. van Woudenberg, 177-210, (Rodopi, 2005)]. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 34 (2003), 106-30. [Reprinted in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, (eds.) M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard, 210-34, (Blackwell, 2003)]. (pdf)

2002

  • ‘Recent Work on Radical Skepticism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002), 215-57. (pdf)

​

  • ‘McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments’, Synthese 130 (2002), 279-302. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2002), 283-307. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and Closure’, Theoria 69 (2002), 129-61. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (2002), 19-55. (pdf)

​

 

  • ‘Are Economic Decisions Rational?: Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and “Hinge” Propositions’, Reason in Practice 2 (2002), 29-40.

2001

  • ‘Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent’, Dialectica 55 (2001), 327-49. (pdf)

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  • ‘Scepticism and Dreaming’, Philosophia 28 (2001), 373-90. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and “Hinge” Propositions’, Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002, (ed.) D. Salehi, 97-122, (Peter Lang, 2001). (pdf)

​

  • 'The Opacity of Knowledge', Essays in Philosophy 2.1 (2001). (pdf)

​​

  • A Puzzle about Warrant’, Philosophical Inquiry 23 (2001), 59-72.

​​

  • Meta-Epistemological Constraints on Anti-Sceptical Theories’, Facta Philosophica 3 (2001), 101-26.

2000

  • ‘Closure and Context’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 275-80. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Is “God Exists” a “Hinge” Proposition of Religious Belief?’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), 129-40. (pdf)

​

  • ‘Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and the ‘Metaepistemological’ Challenge’, Principia—Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2000), 187-214. (pdf)

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  • Understanding Scepticism’, Sats—The Nordic Journal of Philosophy 1 (2000), 107-23.

 

  • ‘Wittgenstein, “Hinge” Propositions, and On Certainty’, Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, (eds.) B. Brogaard & B. Smith, 84-90, (Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society, 2000).

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