• ‘Ignorance and Inquiry’, American Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming). [Translated into Tunisian by Oussama Slim for MAANA]. (pdf)

  • ‘Against the Odds: the Case for a Modal Understanding of Due Care’ (with J. Helmreich), Truth and Trials: Dilemmas at the Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Law, (eds.) Z. Hoskins & J. Robson, (Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)

  • ‘Pyrrhonism and Wittgensteinian Quietism’, Ancient Scepticism and Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) L. Perissinotto & B. R. Cámara, (Mimesis International, forthcoming). (pdf)

  • ‘Exploring Quasi-Fideism’, Hinge Epistemology, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & C. Sandis, (London: Anthem). (pdf)

  • ‘Extended Social Epistemology’, Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, (eds.) J. Lackey & A. McGlynn, (Oxford UP, forthcoming). (pdf)

  • ‘Skeptical Invariantism and the Source of Skepticism’, Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, (eds.) C. Kyriacou & K. Wallbridge, (Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)

  • ‘Assurance and Disjunctivism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming). [Symposium on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity, (Oxford UP, 2018)]. (pdf)

  • ‘Shadowlands’, The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, (ed.) J. Dutant, (Oxford UP, forthcoming). (pdf)

  • ‘Précis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Skepsis (forthcoming). [As part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, (Princeton UP, 2015)]. (pdf), (pdf)

  • ‘Putnam on Radical Skepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion-Sensitive Semantics’, Engaging Putnam, (eds.) J. Conant & S. Chakraborty, (Harvard UP, forthcoming). (pdf)

  • ‘Good News, Bad News, Fake News’, Epistemology of Fake News, (eds.) S. Bernecker, A. Flowerre & T. Grundman, (Oxford UP, forthcoming). (pdf)

  • ‘On Hinge Epistemology’, Skepsis (forthcoming). Iinvited submission; and to be translated into Portuguese in Hinge Epistemology, (eds.) M. N. Figueiredo & P. Smith, (Associação Filosófica Scientiae Studia)]. (pdf)

  • ‘Socrates as Intellectual Character Builder’ (with A. Kotsonis, I. Lytra & T. Scaltsas), Dialogoi: Ancient Philosophy Today (forthcoming). [Invited contribution]. (pdf)


  • ‘Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Commonsense and Philosophy’, Cambridge Companion to Common Sense Philosophy, (eds.) R. Peels & R. van Woudenberg, (Cambridge UP, forthcoming). (pdf)


  • ‘Educating For Intellectual Humility and Conviction’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2020), 398-409. [To be reprinted in Teaching and Learning: Epistemic, Metaphysical and Ethical Dimensions, (ed.) D. Bakhurst, (Blackwell, forthcoming)]. (pdf)

  • ‘Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology’, Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, (eds.) J. Greco & C. Kelp, 203-24, (Cambridge UP, 2020). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Vertigo’, The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds, (eds.) B. Brogaard & D. Gatzia, ch. 7, (Routledge, 2020). (pdf)

  • ‘Extended Cognition and Humility’, Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, (eds.) M. Alfano, M. Lynch & A. Tanesini, ch. 39, (Routledge, 2020). (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge, Skill, and Virtue Epistemology’, Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, (eds.) C. Pavese & E. Fridland, 135-45, (Routledge, 2020). (pdf)

  • ‘Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, (eds.) D. Brown & F. Macpherson, 42-51, (Routledge, 2020). (pdf)


  • ‘The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement’ (with J. A. Carter), Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 44 (2019), 220-42. (pdf)

  • ‘Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux’, Synthese [Online First (2019), DOI:]. [As part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, (Princeton UP, 2015)]. (pdf)

  • ‘Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism’, Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus, (eds.) J. Vlasits & K. M. Vogt, 172-92, (Oxford UP, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Philosophy in Prisons: Intellectual Virtue and the Community of Philosophical Inquiry’, Teaching Philosophy (2019), DOI: 10.5840/teachphil201985108. (pdf

  • ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as Pyrrhonism in Action’, Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at Things From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, (eds.) N. de Costa & S. Wuppuluri, 91-106, (Springer, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Relativism and Epistemic Internalism’, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, (ed.) M. Kusch, 292-300, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Disagreement, Intellectual Humility, and Reflection’, Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology, (ed.) W. Da Silva Filho, ch. 5, (Springer, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Factive Bases for Belief’, Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, (eds.) P. Bondy & J. A. Carter, 235-50, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Scepticism and Atheism’, A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, (ed.) G. Oppy, 277-90, (Blackwell, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Modal Accounts of Luck’, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, (eds.) I. Church & R. Hartman, ch. 10, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Extended Self-Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative, (eds.) J. E. Kirsch & P. Pedrini, 31-49, (Springer, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Extended Entitlement’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Entitlement, (eds.) P. Graham & N. Pedersen, 223-39, (Oxford UP, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Contemporary Responses to Radical Scepticism’, Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945 to 2015, (eds.) K. Becker & I. Thomson, ch. 8, (Cambridge UP, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) H. Battaly, ch. 23, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History—Vol IV: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) S. Hetherington & M. Valaris, ch. 11, (Bloomsbury, 2019). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, (eds.) C. Doyle, J. Milburn & D. H. Pritchard, 41-58, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)


  • ‘Epistemic Angst’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2018), 70-90. [Translated into Spanish as ‘La Angustia Epistémica’ by T. Verthen for Problemas Escépticos (‘Skeptical Problems’), (ed.) J. Ornelas]. (pdf)

  • ‘Unnatural Doubts’, Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, (eds.) G. A. Bruno & A. Rutherford, 223-47, (Routledge 2018). (pdf)

  • ‘Extended Virtue Epistemology’, Inquiry 61 (2018), 632-47. (pdf)

  • ‘Legal Risk, Legal Evidence, and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice’, Jurisprudence 9 (2018), 108-19. [Reprinted in The Faces of Virtue in Law, (eds.) A. Amaya & C. Michelon, ch. 9, (Routledge, 2019)]. (pdf)

  • ‘Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education’, Metaphilosophy 49 (2018), 328-49. [Reprinted in Connecting Virtues: Advances in Ethics, Epistemology, and Political Philosophy, (eds.) M. Croce & M. S. Vaccarezza, 129-50, (Blackwell, 2018). (pdf)

  • ‘Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2018), 51-66. (pdf)

  • ‘Disagreement, of Belief and Otherwise’, Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, (ed.) C. Johnson, 22-39, (Routledge, 2018). (pdf)

  • ‘Extended Knowledge’, Extended Epistemology, (eds.) J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos & D. H. Pritchard, 90-104, (Oxford UP, 2018). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Biscopic Treatment of Radical Scepticism’, The Factive Turn in Epistemology, (ed.) V. Mitova, 15-31, (Cambridge UP, 2018). [Translated into Portugese by E. Carvalho, and published in Sképsis]. (pdf)

  • ‘The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck’, The Gettier Problem, (ed.) S. Hetherington, 96-107, (Cambridge UP, 2018). (pdf)

  • ‘Precis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Manuscrito 41 (2018), 115-65. [As part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing (Princeton UP, 2015)]. (pdf), (pdf

  • ‘Aesthetic Risk’, Think 17 (2018), 1-14. (pdf)

  • The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter & J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2018). 


  • ‘Faith and Reason’, Philosophy (invited special issue on Religious Epistemology), 81 (2017), 101-18. (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemically Useful False Beliefs’, Philosophical Explorations 20 (2017), 4-20. (pdf)

  • ‘Scepticism and Disjunctivism’ (with C. Ranalli), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, (eds.) D. Machuca & B. Reed, 652-67, (Bloomsbury, 2017). (pdf)

  • ‘Inference to the Best Explanation and Epistemic Circularity’ (with J. A. Carter), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, (eds.) K. McCain & T. Poston, 133-48, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge-First Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge-First Epistemology, (eds.) J. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis, 200-22, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)

  • ‘Wittgenstein on Hinge Commitments and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty’, Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, (eds.) H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman, 563-75, (Blackwell, 2017). (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge, Luck and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem’, Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on The Gettier Problem, (eds.) C. Almeida, P. Klein & R. Borges, 57-73, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Situationism, Epistemic Dependence, and the Epistemology of Education’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Situationism, (eds.) M. Alfano & A. Fairweather, 168-91, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)

  • ‘Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding’ (with J. A. Carter), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, (eds.) S. Ammon, C. Baumberger, C. Beisbart, G. Brun & S. Grimm, 272-92, (Routledge, 2017). (pdf)

  • ‘Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value’, Synthese 194 (2017), 1477–86. (pdf)

  • ‘Intellectual Pride and Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pride, (eds.) J. A. Carter & E. Gordon, 69-78, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). (pdf)

  • ‘Is There a Fundamental Tension Between Faith and Rationality?’, Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, 53-61, (Routledge, 2017).

  • ‘How Do Scientific Claims Relate to the Truth?’ (with S. O Palermos), Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, 4-15, (Routledge, 2017).


  • ‘Epistemic Risk’, Journal of Philosophy 113 (2016), 550-71. (pdf)

  • ‘Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophical Studies 173 (2016), 969-90. (pdf)

  • ‘Seeing It For Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy’, Episteme 13 (2016), 29-42. (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Dependence’, Philosophical Perspectives 30 (2016), 1-20. (pdf)

  • ‘Contextualism and Radical Scepticism’, Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1122-0. (pdf)

  • ‘Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification’ (with P. Bondy), Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1262-2. (pdf)

  • ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat’, Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1074-4. (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Axiology’, Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals, (eds.) M. Grajner & P. Schmechtig, 407-22, (DeGruyter, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism’ and ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism: Responses to My Critics’, Journal of Philosophical Research (2016) 41, 175-81 & 221-38. [As part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 2012)]. (pdf), (pdf)

  • ‘The Distribution of Epistemic Agency’ (with O. Palermos), Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-Centralizing Epistemic Agency, (ed.) P. Reider, 109-26, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Res Philosophica 93 (2016), 533-52. (pdf)

  • ‘Ignorance and Epistemic Value’, The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, (eds.) M. Blaauw & R. Peels, 132-43, (Cambridge UP, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays In Applied Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) J. Baehr, 113-27, (Routledge, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications, (ed.) M. Fernandez, 31-50, (Oxford UP, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘On Metaepistemological Scepticism’ (with C. Ranalli), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, (eds.) M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger, 205-23, (Oxford UP, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘Radical Scepticism and Brains in Vats’ (with C. Ranalli), The Brain in a Vat, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 75-89, (Cambridge UP, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘Intellectual Humility, Knowledge-How, and Disagreement’ (with J. A. Carter), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue, (eds.) M. Slote, E. Sosa & C. Mi, 49-63, (Routledge, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘The Sources of Scepticism’, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (invited special issue on Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein), 6 (2016), 203-27. [Translated into Spanish by V. Raga-Rosaleny for Estudios de Filosofía 60 (2019), 239-66]. (pdf)

  • ‘Veritism and Epistemic Value’, Alvin Goldman and His Critics, (eds.) H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin, 200-18, (Blackwell, 2016). (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue’, Zi Ran Bian Zheng Fa Tong Xun [Journal of Dialectics of Nature], (2016). [Invited].


  • ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015), 93-111. (pdf)

  • ‘Risk’, Metaphilosophy 46 (2015), 436-61. (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck’ (with J. A. Carter), Noûs 49 (2015), 440-53. (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015), 181-99. (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value’ (with J. A. Carter), Australasian Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2015), 799-816. (pdf)

  • ‘Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism’ and ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism: Responses to My Critics’, Analysis 75 (2015), 589-95 & 627-37.[As part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 2012)]. (pdf), (pdf)

  • ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman’, God, Truth and Other Enigmas, (ed.) M. Szatkowski, 141-64, (de Gruyter, 2015). (pdf)

  • ‘Die Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie’, Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu?, (eds.) D. Koppelberg & S. Tolksdorf, 153-78, (Mentis, 2015).


  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth’ (with J. Kallestrup), European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014), 335-57. (pdf)

  • ‘The Modal Account of Luck’, Metaphilosophy 45 (2014), 594-619. [Reprinted in The Philosophy of Luck, (eds.) D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington, 143-68, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015)]. (pdf)

  • ‘Varieties of Externalism’ (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), Philosophical Issues 24 (2014), 63-109. (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, Virtue Scientia: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, (ed.) A. Fairweather, 315-28, (Springer, 2014). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion’, Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, (eds.) C. Littlejohn & J. Turri, 155-72, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)

  • ‘Sceptical Intuitions’, Intuitions, (eds.) D. Rowbottom & T. Booth, 213-31, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)

  • ‘Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing’, Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, (eds.) D. Dodd & E. Zardini, 190-213, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)

  • ‘Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good’, The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, (eds.) J. Matheson & R. Vitz, 112-29, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)

  • ‘Re-evaluating the Epistemic Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology’, Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, (eds.) A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan, 143-54, (Cambridge UP, 2014). (pdf)

  • ‘What is this Thing Called Science? A Very Brief Philosophical Overview’, (with M. Massimi), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone, (ed.) M. Massimi, 1-13, (Routledge, 2014).  

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture 478 (2014), 47-66. [Invited]. (pdf)

  • ‘Zagzebski on Rationality’ (with S. Ryan), European Journal of Philosophy of Religion 6 (2014), 39-46. (pdf)


  • ‘The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, (eds.) J. Greco & R. Groff, ch. 13, (Routledge, 2013). (pdf)

  • ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, (eds.) T. Henning & D. Schweikard, 209-226, (Routledge, 2013). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2013), 236-47. [Reprinted in Education and the Growth of Knowledge: Perspectives From Social and Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) B. Kotzee, 92-105, (Blackwell, 2013)]. (pdf)

  • ‘Davidson on Radical Skepticism’, Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, (eds.) E. LePore & K. Ludwig, 521-33, (Blackwell, 2013). (pdf

  • ‘There Cannot be Lucky Knowledge’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd Ed.), (eds.) M. Steup, J. Turri & E. Sosa, 152-64, (Blackwell, 2013). (pdf)

  • ‘Rorty, Williams and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Humanities (invited submission for special issue on Richard Rorty), 2 (2013), 351-68. (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemic Value’, Philosophical Inquiries 1 (2013), 1-37. [Invited]. (pdf)

  • ‘Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo’ (with C. Boult), Philosophia 41 (2013), 27-35. (pdf)


  • ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012), 247-79. [Reprinted in Epistemology: Major Works, (ed.) R. Neta, (Routledge, 2013); translated by G. Gaboardy into Portugese for Intuitio 9 (2016), 148-181; translated by J. Wang, Y. Yinzhu & L. Linhui into Chinese for Contemporary Western Philosophy 14 (2018), 137-64]. (pdf)

  • ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2012), 84-103. (pdf)

  • ‘Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing’, Synthese 189 (2012), 255-72. [Translated into Portugese by J. do Carmo]. (pdf)

  • ‘In Defence of Modest Anti-Luck Epistemology’, The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, (eds.) T. Black & K. Becker, 173-92, (Cambridge UP, 2012). (pdf)

  • ‘On Meta-Epistemology’, Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (2012), 91-108. (pdf)

  • ‘Disagreement, Scepticism, and Track-Record Arguments’, Disagreement and Skepticism, (ed.) D. Machuca, 150-68, (Routledge, 2012). (pdf)

  • ‘Hume on Miracles’ (with A. Richmond), The Continuum Companion to Hume, (eds.) A. Bailey & D. O’Brien, 227-45, (Continuum, 2012). (pdf)


  • ‘Two Conceptions of Radical Scepticism’, Ámbitos 28 (2012), 13-20. [Invited submission for special issue on Radical Scepticism].


  • ‘Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism’, Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, (ed.) D. Machuca, 193-202, (Springer 2011). (pdf

  • ‘Wittgenstein on Scepticism’, The Oxford Handbook on Wittgenstein, (eds.) O. Kuusela & M. McGinn, 521-47, (Oxford UP, 2011). (pdf)

  • ‘What is the Swamping Problem?’, Reasons for Belief, (eds.) A. Reisner & A. Steglich-Petersen, 244-59, (Cambridge UP, 2011). (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem’, Philosophical Issues 21 (2011), 434-55. (pdf)

  • ‘The Genealogy of the Concept of Knowledge and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Der Begriff des Wissens/Conceptions of Knowledge, (ed.) S. Tolksdorf, 159-78, (de Gruyter, 2011). (pdf)

  • ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 4 (2011), 145-59. (pdf)

  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2011). [Updated version available here].

  • ‘Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism’, Evidentialism and its Discontents, (ed.) T. Dougherty, 362-92, (Oxford UP, 2011). (pdf)

  • ‘Skepticism and Information’ (with E. T. Kerr), Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy of Technology, (ed.) H. Demir, (Springer, 2011).


  • ‘Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge, and Discrimination’, Noûs 44 (2010), 245-68. (pdf)

  • ‘Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis’, Synthese 175 (2010), 133-51. (pdf)

  • ‘Absurdity, Angst and The Meaning of Life’, Monist (2010) 93, 3-16. (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology’, The Blackwell Companion to Relativism, (ed.) S. Hales, 266-85, (Blackwell, 2010). (pdf)

  • ‘Achievements, Luck and Value’, Think 25 (2010), 1-12. (pdf)


  • ‘Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism’, Synthese 171 (2009), 467-79. (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.) A. O’Hear, 19-43, (Cambridge UP, 2009). (pdf)

  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Harvard Review of Philosophy (2009) 16, 2-19. (pdf)

  • ‘Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning’ (with C. Kelp), All Truths Are Known: New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, (ed.) J. Salerno, 324-38, (Oxford UP, 2009). (pdf)

  • ‘Defusing Epistemic Relativism’, Synthese 166 (2009), 397-412. (pdf)

  • ‘Apt Performance and Epistemic Value’, Philosophical Studies (2009) 143, 407-16. (pdf)

  • ‘Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?’, Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (2009), 33-45. (pdf)

  • ‘Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge’, Analysis 69 (2009), 317-25. (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2009) 17, 589-96. (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge’, Central Issues of Philosophy, (ed.) J. Shand, 24-36, (Blackwell, 2009). (pdf)

  • ‘Radical Scepticism and Epistemic Value’, Iris 1 (2009), 419-28. [Invited for special issue on Contemporary Anti-Scepticism].


  • ‘Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements’, Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 437-47. (pdf)

  • ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value’, Proceedings and Addresses of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.) 82 (2008), 19-41. (pdf)

  • ‘McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism’, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, 283-310, (Oxford UP, 2008). (pdf)

  • ‘Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology’, The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, (ed.) J. Greco, 437-55, (Oxford UP, 2008). (pdf)

  • ‘Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (2008), 325-39. (pdf)

  • ‘Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism’, Social Epistemology 22 (2008), 305-23. (pdf)

  • ‘Certainty and Scepticism’, Philosophical Issues 18 (2008), 58-67. (pdf)

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited’, Metaphilosophy 39 (2008), 66-88. (pdf)

  • ‘A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophica 78 (2008), 13-28. (pdf)


  • ‘McDowell and the New Evil Genius’ (with R. Neta), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), 381-96. (pdf)

  • ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Synthese 158 (2007), 277-97. [As part of a special issue devoted to my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, 2005)]. (pdf)

  • ‘How to be a Neo-Moorean’, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 68-99, (Oxford UP, 2007). (pdf)

  • ‘Recent Work on Epistemic Value’, American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007), 85-110. (pdf)

  • ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries’, New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.) V. F. Hendricks & D. H. Pritchard, 28-51, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). (pdf)

  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2007). [Updated version, now co-authored, available here]. 


  • ‘Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck’, Philosophical Studies 116 (2006), 135-45. (pdf)

  • ‘Moral and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 37 (2006), 1-25. (pdf)


  • ‘Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005), 185-206. (pdf)

  • ‘The Structure of Sceptical Arguments’, Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 37-52. (pdf)

  • ‘Contextualism, Scepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manœuvres’, Knowledge and Skepticism, (eds.) J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein, 85-104, (MIT Press, 2005). (pdf)

  • ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism’, Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein’s Last Work, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, 189-224, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). (pdf)

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge’, Philosophical Explorations 8 (2005), 229-43. (pdf)

  • ‘Neo-Mooreanism versus Contextualism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (2005), 20-43. (pdf)

  • ‘Greco on Scepticism’ (with C. van Putten), Erkenntnis 62 (2005), 277-84. (pdf)

  • ‘Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism’, Acta Analytica 20 (2005), 3-25. (pdf)


  • ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), 326-48. [To be translated into Portuguese]. (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Luck’, Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004), 193-222. (pdf)

  • ‘Epistemic Deflationism’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004), 103-34. (pdf)     


  • ‘The Psychology and Philosophy of Luck’ (with M. Smith), New Ideas in Psychology 22 (2004), 1-28. (pdf)

  • ‘Testimony’, The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due Process, (eds.) R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros, 101-20, (Hart, 2004). (pdf)

  • ‘An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism’ (with J. Kallestrup), Philosophia 31 (2004), 345-54. (pdf)

  • ‘Some Recent Work in Epistemology’, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 604-13. (pdf)


  • ‘McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism’, European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003), 273-94. (pdf)

  • ‘Reforming Reformed Epistemology’, International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003), 43-66. [Reprinted in Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge, (eds.) R. Rood, S. Roeser & R. van Woudenberg, 177-210, (Rodopi, 2005)]. (pdf)

  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 34 (2003), 106-30. [Reprinted in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, (eds.) M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard, 210-34, (Blackwell, 2003)]. (pdf)


  • ‘Recent Work on Radical Skepticism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002), 215-57. (pdf)

  • ‘McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments’, Synthese 130 (2002), 279-302. (pdf)

  • ‘Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2002), 283-307. (pdf)

  • ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and Closure’, Theoria 69 (2002), 129-61. (pdf)

  • ‘Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (2002), 19-55. (pdf)


  • ‘Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent’, Dialectica 55 (2001), 327-49. (pdf)

  • ‘Scepticism and Dreaming’, Philosophia 28 (2001), 373-90. (pdf)

  • ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and “Hinge” Propositions’, Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002, (ed.) D. Salehi, 97-122, (Peter Lang, 2001). (pdf)

  • 'The Opacity of Knowledge', Essays in Philosophy 2.1 (2001). (pdf)


  • ‘Closure and Context’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 275-80. (pdf)

  • ‘Is “God Exists” a “Hinge” Proposition of Religious Belief?’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), 129-40. (pdf)

  • ‘Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and the ‘Metaepistemological’ Challenge’, Principia—Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2000), 187-214. (pdf)

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